A Normal Country

During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a belligerent adversary of the West to a cooperative partner. Yet a consensus in the US circa 2000 viewed Russia as a disastrous and threatening failure, and the 1990s as a decade of catastrophe for its citizens. Analyzing a variety of economic and political data, we demonstrate a large gap between this perception and the facts. In contrast to the common image, by the late 1990s Russia had become a typical middle- income capitalist democracy.

Tumor Suppressor p53 in Cerebellar Development, Medulloblastoma Initiation, and Treatment Resistance.

TP53 is a crucial tumor suppressor inactivated in the majority of human cancers. Medulloblastoma (MB), the most common malignant pediatric brain tumor, is an exception, rarely mutating TP53. Within the Sonic Hedgehog (SHH) MB subtype, TP53 mutation is a prognostic factor, and mutant TP53 SHH-MBs have the worst prognosis of all subtypes. How most SHH-MBs can form without mutating TP53 remains unclear. Almost all SHH-MBs with TP53 mutation arise during childhood, indicating that mutation to TP53 must occur during a limited developmental window. Early postnatal (postnatal day 0.5) granule cell precursors (GCPs) are p53-activation resistant following genotoxic stress, whereas late postnatal (postnatal day 10) GCPs are p53-activation sensitive. I hypothesize that a p53-activation resistant GCP population gives rise to p53 wild type SHH-MBs and that p53-activation sensitive GCPs are eliminated during postnatal development unless they harbor mutant p53. Using two mutant p53 alleles, a conditional knockout, p53∆E5-6, and a hypomorph, p53R172P, I demonstrated that p53 activation occurs during cerebellar development, and is activated in the earliest detectable lesions driven by Ptch1 loss. Consistently, p53-dependent apoptosis plays a major role in both the initiation and progression of SHH-MBs, while p53-dependent cell cycle arrest only delays SHH-MB progression. Surprisingly, a subset of Ptch1-deficient pre-neoplastic lesions (PNLs) showed no evidence of p53 activation, regardless of p53 mutation, providing a mechanistic basis for the formation of p53 wild type (WT) SHH-MBs. To test whether these PNL represented a p53-activation resistant population, I designed a clinically relevant treatment scheme to induce genotoxic stress and elicit a heightened p53 response. I found that treatment eliminated all PNL cells and reduced the incidence of SHH-MBs, but only when p53-mediated apoptosis was activated. Activation of p53-mediated cell-cycle arrest alone halted proliferation and induced neuronal differentiation, but failed to eliminate Sox2-positive stem-like cells, which were capable of surviving treatment and generating highly proliferative SHH-MB. Thus, only when p53 activation surpasses a critical threshold will Sox2-positive stem-like cells be eliminated, preventing p53 recurrence and determining therapeutic outcomes.PHDCellular & Molecular BiologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/135886/1/treisman_1.pd

Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason

A long-standing debate pits those who think economic development leads to democratization against those who argue that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but in the medium run (10 to 20 years). The reason is that, for the most part, higher income only prompts a breakthrough to more democratic politics after the incumbent leader falls from power. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the leader’s odds of survival. This logic—for which I provide evidence at the levels of individual countries and the world—helps explain why democracy advances in waves followed by periods of stasis and why dictators, concerned only to entrench themselves in power, end up preparing their countries to leap to a higher level of democracy when they are eventually overthrown.

The Geography of Fear

Whether the danger invoked is nuclear war or genetically modified foods, far more people in some countries than in others say they are afraid. Using data from six surveys, I show that the levels of reported fear of different dangers correlate strongly across both individuals and countries. I construct indexes of fearfulness for 15-25 countries and map the prevalence of fear in Western Europe. About two thirds of the crossnational variation within Europe can be explained by differences in pessimism—the degree to which respondents exaggerate the likelihood of disasters. Among the countries for which I have data, the most robust correlates of fearfulness relate to countries‘ religious traditions. Fear tends to be higher in countries where more people believe in Hell and where fewer believe in Heaven.

Oil and Democracy in Russia

Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called “resource curse”—the argument that natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining various data, I show that such fears are exaggerated. Evidence from around the world suggests that for countries like Russia with an established oil industry, even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect on the political regime. In addition, Russia—a country with an industrialized economy, a highly educated, urbanized population, and an oil sector that remains majority private-owned—is unlikely to be susceptible to most of the hypothesized pernicious effects of resource dependence.

"Loans for Shares" Revisited

The "loans for shares" scheme of 1995-6—in which a handful of well-connected businessmen bought stakes in major Russian companies—is widely considered a scandal that slowed subsequent Russian economic growth. Fifteen years later, I reexamine the details of the program. In light of evidence available today, I concur with the critics that the scheme’s execution appeared corrupt. However, in most other regards the conventional wisdom was wrong. The stakes involved represented a small fraction of the market; the pricing in most cases was in line with international practice; and the scheme can only explain a small part of Russia's increasing wealth inequality. The biggest beneficiaries were not the so-called "oligarchs," but Soviet era industrial managers. After the oligarchs consolidated control, their firms performed far better than comparable state enterprises and companies sold to incumbent managers, and helped fuel Russia’s rapid growth after 1999.

Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism

Economic

The US and Russia: They Don't Need Us

Economic

Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology

Economic